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Compensation Committee Governance Quality, Chief Executive Officer
Stock Options Grants, and Future Firm Performance

Abstract
This paper examines whether the relationship between future firm performance and chief
executive officer (CEO) stock option grants is affected by the quality of the compensation
committee, the responsibilities of which include determining the CEO’s compensation
package. Compensation committee quality is measured using six committee
characteristics – the proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent
CEO, the proportion of senior directors with at least ten years’ board service, the
proportion of directors who are CEOs of other companies, the aggregate shareholding of
directors who are members of the compensation committee, the proportion of directors
with three or more additional board seats (so-called “busy directors”), and compensation
committee size. The study documents strong evidence that future earnings performance
is positively associated with stock option grants as compensation committee quality
increases.

Jerry Sun, Steven F. Cahan, and David Emanuel. 2009. Journal of Banking and
Finance, 33(8), 1507-1519. Post-print

1.

Introduction
Compensation committees have regularly attracted the attention of politicians and

regulators because of their central role in establishing CEO compensation, and setting the
parameters for the compensation of other senior executives. In 1993, Congress passed
legislation requiring that compensation committees be composed of two or more outside
directors for performance-based pay in excess of $1 million to be tax deductible (Internal
Revenue Code Section 162 (m)) and in 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) approved new listing rules that require all listed firms to have compensation
committees that consist solely of outside directors.1 Although some studies (e.g.,
Anderson and Bizjak 2003, Newman and Mozes 1999, Vafeas 2003a) investigate
compensation committees, there is substantially less published research on this committee
than on audit committees (Klein 2003).
In this study, we investigate whether the relationship between CEO stock option
grants and subsequent performance is affected by the quality of the compensation
committee. The argument is that better corporate governance is reflected in higher
quality compensation committees which are capable of designing and implementing
remuneration arrangements that will lead to stronger incentives for subsequent
performance, and reduce the capacity of CEOs to extract rents. A finding that the
relationship between CEO option grants and future firm performance is increasing in
compensation committee quality is consistent with this proposition.

1

The relevant rules are NYSE Corporate Governance 303A.05, NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and
AMEX Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules Sec 805.
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We measure compensation committee quality using six metrics. They are the
proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO, the proportion
of senior directors with at least ten years’ board service, the proportion of directors who
are CEOs of other companies, the aggregate shareholding of directors, the proportion of
directors with three or more additional board seats, and compensation committee size.
We use these six measures as compensation committee quality is unlikely to depend on a
single dimension and because similar measures have been used in the study of boards and
audit committees.2 These six metrics are combined in two ways – by factor analysis and
by aggregating scores for the six measures. Thus, our measure of compensation
committee quality is broader and more comprehensive than compensation committee
independence (i.e., the proportion of outside directors on the committee) which has been
used to measure compensation committee quality in much of the prior literature. Put
differently, we expect that compensation committee quality can differ even when all
compensation committees are independent.
Using a sample of 474 US listed companies all of which have independent
compensation committees at a time when such independence was not required, we find
evidence that the relationship between CEO stock option grants and subsequent one-,
two- and three years ahead operating income increases as compensation committee
quality increases. This result also holds where stock returns are used as the performance
2

Core et al. (1999) find that the proportion of outside directors on the board appointed by the CEO
and the proportion of outside directors on the board who serve on three or more other boards are positively
associated with the level of CEO compensation. Bedard et al. (2004) use directors’ board service time and
the number of directors on the audit committee as a proxy for committee expertise and activity,
respectively. Daily et al. (1998) suggest that directors who are CEOs of other firms may have lower
governance quality. Klein (2002a) documents a negative association between earnings management and
the proportion of blockholders on the audit committee.
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metric. The results support the notion that a consequence of higher compensation
committee quality is compensation contracts that result in superior future performance.
Higher quality compensation committees appear to improve incentive alignment, and as a
consequence, rent extraction is likely to be reduced.
We contribute to the existing but limited body of research on compensation
committee effectiveness (Daily et. al. 1998, Conyon and Peck 1998, Newman and Mozes
1999, Anderson and Bizjak 2003, Vafeas 2003a, Conyon and He 2004) in several ways.
First, we assess the effectiveness of compensation committees by examining the
relationship between stock option grants and future firm performance. The relationship
between option grants and performance is of interest in addressing issues of the
effectiveness of compensation arrangements, and the role of the compensation committee
in this process is important as this committee has the delegated responsibility of making
the recommendation to the board on CEO pay, among other tasks. Second, we introduce
a new and more comprehensive measure of compensation committee quality. Such a
measure is needed because under the 2003 stock exchange listing rules (which require
independent compensation committees), the old measure of compensation committee
quality – compensation committee independence – can no longer be used. Third, our
sample of 474 firms is significantly larger than that used in prior studies (the next largest
is Vafeas 2003a, with a maximum of 267 firms). Fourth, our data which are from 2001
are more recent than data used in prior studies (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak’s (2003)
sample period goes to 1998).

3

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
studies, develops the research design, and states the hypothesis. Section 3 explains the
analysis. The results are reported in section 4 and section 5 concludes the paper.

2.

Related Studies, Hypothesis Development and Research Design

2.1

General Motivation
There are a number of theoretical formulations that derive the result that incentive

based compensation is a viable mechanism for aligning the interests of managers and
shareholders (e.g., Ross 1973, Becker and Stigler 1974, Jensen and Meckling 1976,
Lazear 1979, Holmstrom 1979, Demsetz and Lehn 1985). In these models, the way in
which compensation is structured ex-ante motivates managers to act in the interests of
principals. An ex-post outcome should be better performance, on average.
Prior empirical research documents evidence consistent with the view that
compensation serves an incentive alignment role. For example, using long-term stock
market performance as a measure of corporate performance, Masson (1971) finds that
firms with executives whose financial rewards are more closely parallel to shareholders’
interests outperform other firms over the post-war period. Abowd (1990) finds that
increased performance sensitivity in compensation is positively associated with increased
subsequent corporate performance measured by either gross economic return or stock
market performance, and Conyon and Freeman (2002) provide evidence that shared
compensation in the U.K. is positively associated with either productivity measured by
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real sales growth or stock market performance. 3
This study is closest in design to that of Hanlon et al. (2003). They examine
whether increasing stock option grants are associated with higher future earnings
performance. They document that one dollar of Black-Scholes value of stock option
grant generates $3.71 of future operating income over the following five years. They
conclude that the payoff is attributable to the economic determinants of option grants and
not to “poor” governance quality. 4 In sum, their results are consistent with their
incentive alignment hypothesis and not with what they call a “rent extraction” story.
On the other hand, recent studies (e.g., Bebchuk et al. 2002, Bebchuk and Fried
2003, 2004) have emphasized managerial power as a dominant influence in explaining
the level and characteristics of executive pay. Managers with more power are able to
extract more rent, defined as value in excess of what they would receive under optimal
contracting. Therefore, the efficiency of compensation contracts would be discounted in
some circumstances where compensation committees are less effective in fulfilling their
duty or where it is easier for managers to shape their own pay arrangements. The
discounting of contracting efficiency would lead to an agency cost that is larger than its
optimal cost, and a shareholder value that is smaller than its optimal value. Thus, using
incentive-based compensation contracts may not solve agency problems between
executives and shareholders. Instead, the agency problems can lead to rent extraction.
Bebchuk and Fried are particularly critical of what they call “conventional” stock option
3

These are profit sharing, profit related pay schemes, Save As You Earn schemes, and stock option
plans, all of which had tax advantages in the United Kingdom at differing times from 1987 onwards.
4
Including the beginning of the year portfolio of executive options held, cash compensation,
investment opportunities, current and prior year share performance, losses, leverage, and earnings volatility.
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plans, e.g., plans based on at-the-money option grants, without indexing outcomes to
benchmark performance, and where executives can sell their shares immediately after
exercise.
Prior research also finds evidence consistent with this rent extraction or
managerial power argument. Core et al. (1999) examine whether a weak corporate
governance structure leads to excess compensation, and then poorer future firm
performance. They find that the excess compensation paid to CEOs is negatively
associated with subsequent firm performance. Further, DeFusco et al. (1991) find that
firms that changed their stock option plans over the 1987 – 1982 period experienced
earnings declines relative to industry levels and long-term declines in cumulative
abnormal returns, which suggests that the changes were unsuccessful as a means of
generating improved performance.
In addition, several previous studies find that stock option plans have
dysfunctional effects. For instance, Yermack (1997) documents positive abnormal
returns immediately after the granting of options, suggesting that CEOs receive stock
options shortly before the announcement of good news. Aboody and Kasznik (2003) find
evidence consistent with the proposition that managers delay good news announcements
until after the date of scheduled option awards, and accelerate bad news before the date of
option awards. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find that insiders time the exercise of
stock options based on private information and Lie (2005) finds that abnormal stock
returns are negative before unscheduled awards and positive after, and this pattern has
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become stronger over time. His results are consistent with the view that at least some
award dates for the issue of executive options are set retrospectively.
In summary, the incentive alignment argument that executive compensation
contracts align the interests of managers and those of shareholders and then enhance firm
performance is supported by not only optimal contract theory but also evidence
documented in several prior studies (e.g., Hanlon et al. 2003). On the other hand, the
argument that managers use compensation contracts to extract rents is consistent with the
managerial power/rent extraction approach. Some previous studies (e.g., Core et al.
1999) also provide evidence supporting this argument.
We expect that whether executive compensation is associated with incentive
alignment will depend on the strength of corporate governance. Many studies find that
high governance quality can constrain managerial opportunism (e.g., Klein 2002a,
Carcello and Neal 2000, Carcello and Neal 2003).5 Thus, executive compensation is
more likely to be associated with incentive alignment if corporate governance quality is
higher, whereas the association of rent extraction with executive compensation will be
higher if corporate governance quality is lower. This suggests that the alignment of
incentives by executive compensation contracts increases in corporate governance
quality.
Since compensation committees are responsible for establishing, administering,
overseeing, and advising on executive compensation plans, the corporate governance
quality of these committees directly affects executive compensation. Committees with
5

Klein (2002a) measures governance quality using board independence. Carcello and Neal (2000,
2003) use audit committee independence as a measure of governance quality.
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high governance quality can mitigate agency problems, and thus enhance incentive
alignment. Moreover, high corporate governance quality of compensation committees
leads to better designed executive compensation contracts that can motivate managers to
make superior decisions, resulting in better firm performance. The relationship between
operating income and stock option grants is derived from Lev and Sougianis (1996).
Their production function states that operating income is a function of tangible and
intangible assets. The latter includes the incremental intellectual capital contributed
through the option granting process. Thus, we expect that the association between stock
option compensation and subsequent accounting performance will increase as
compensation committee governance quality increases. The hypothesis is stated as
follows:
H1

As compensation committee governance quality increases, the strength of the

relationship between CEO stock option grants and future firm performance increases.

2.2

Comprehensive Measure of Compensation Committee Governance Quality
The central issue is therefore how we might measure “compensation committee

governance quality”. We use six characteristics.6
(1) The first measure is what we call “CEO appointed directors”, which are
directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO, and who are therefore likely
to have a more amiable relationship with the CEO (e.g., Wade et al. 1990, Dailey et al.
1998, Larcker et al. 2007). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) state that there is a variety of
6

We identified these six compensation committee characteristics based on two criteria: (1) they are
supported by theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, and (2) the data are available in proxy
statements.
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social and psychological factors (collegiality, team spirit, a desire to avoid conflict,
friendship and loyalty) that will lead to pay arrangements that reflect CEO power. As a
result of the CEO’s influence, all directors – but particularly CEO appointed directors –
are likely to have an interdependent relationship with the CEO. Bebchuk and Fried
(2004) assert that a nomination committee of the board is unlikely to nominate a
candidate to become a director without approval of the CEO, and the process is likely to
be that this committee will approve the candidate(s) that the CEO recommends. Thus, a
compensation committee with more CEO appointed directors is likely to be less effective.
We use the proportion of CEO appointed directors on the compensation committee
multiplied by -1 (APPOINT) as one component of committee quality.
(2) Long-serving directors are likely to be more effective because of their greater
experience (e.g., Vafeas 2003b). Arguably, long-serving directors will have greater firmspecific reputational capital at stake (Fama and Jensen 1983). Beasley (1996) finds that
the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases as outside director tenure on the
board increases, suggesting that long-serving outside directors are more effective in
constraining accounting frauds. On the other hand, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that
long-serving outside directors are likely to remain entrenched as it is difficult to dislodge
them without a crisis. As we place emphasis on reputation and effectiveness being
related to length of service, for our second measure of quality we use the proportion of
directors on the committee with 10 or more years of board service time (SENIOR).7

7

To the extent that “long-serving” equates to “old,” our prediction is in the opposite direction to
Larcker et al. (2007) who hypothesize that old (greater than seventy) directors are less effective, but they
find no support for that hypothesis.
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(3) Since CEOs are a relatively homogenous, cohesive collection of individuals
(e.g., Useem 1984), the presence of CEOs from other firms on the compensation
committee may result in a general propensity to support the CEO when deciding on pay
issues (e.g., Lorsch and MacIver 1989, Daily et al. 1998). Thus, a committee with a
higher proportion of CEO directors will have lower governance effectiveness under this
view. Ezzamel and Watson (1997) refer to a “cosy collusion” between executive and
non-executive directors who sit on each other’s compensation committees. Fayere (2008)
finds support for the view that CEOs are paid more and their compensation is less
sensitive to firm performance when other CEOs serve on their boards, and that this excess
pay is not explained by economic determinants associated with the riskiness of the job.
On the other hand, Fahlenbrach et al. (2008) do not find any evidence that directors’
incentives are distorted by having CEOs on the board in testing what they call “the buddy
hypothesis”. So other CEOs might be more effective members because of their expertise
and reputation, but we are not aware of any research that supports this view in the
specific context of compensation committees.8 We use the proportion of the CEOs of
other firms on the committee multiplied by -1 (CEODIR) as a third measure of
compensation committee quality.
(4) Directors with high stock ownership should have interests more aligned with
shareholders and may have stronger incentives to monitor the CEO (Shivdasani and
Yermack 1999). Klein (2002b) finds that an outside block shareholder sitting on the

8

With our data (referred to below), we find that the proportion of CEO directors is positively
correlated with CEO stock option grants for our sample firms, suggesting that those directors may do the
CEO a favor.
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audit committee can constrain earnings management. Friday and Sirmans (1998) report a
positive relationship between market-to-book ratios and dollar values of director
ownership for real estate investment trusts, which they interpret as indicating that
increased director stock ownership assists in aligning managerial incentives with those of
the stockholders. Thus, we postulate that an independent committee with higher
directors’ shareholdings will have higher governance quality. We use the aggregate
directors’ shareholding deflated by the number of directors on the committee as a fourth
measure of compensation committee quality (SHARES). Of course, extending Morck et
al. (1988), excessive director shareholdings could lead to entrenchment, but in our
sample, on average compensation committee directors hold only 0.23% of shares of the
firm.
(5) Core et al. (1999) find that busier outside directors on the board are associated
with greater CEO compensation, suggesting that corporate governance of those directors
is weak. Again, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) provide evidence that firms with busy
boards, those in which a majority of outside directors have three or more additional board
seats, are associated with weak corporate governance. Larcker et al. (2007) classify busy
directors as increasing in “bad” governance, although Ferris et al. (2003) do not find any
evidence that busy directors shirk their responsibilities. We postulate that an independent
compensation committee with a higher proportion of additional directorships will have
lower governance quality. We use the proportion of directors with three or more
additional board seats on the compensation committee multiplied by -1 (BUSYDIR) as a
fifth measure of committee quality.
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(6) Bushman et al. (2004) argue that larger boards have the advantage of more
advisors and monitors of management, and Agrawal and Knoeber (1999) advocate larger
size boards in firms where information is otherwise difficult to obtain. In the context of
compensation, it is probably more difficult for CEOs to exert as much influence over a
larger committee. More independent compensation committee membership gives more
opportunity for challenge of CEO excesses. Thus, we argue that compensation
committee quality is likely to be better when the number of directors on the committee
(CMSIZE) is higher.9
To measure the overall governance quality of compensation committees, the study
employs two comprehensive measures based on these six individual metrics. The first
comprehensive measure, CCQ1, is the factor score from a factor analysis of the six
individual measures, adjusted by deducting the mean factor score in each two-digit SIC
industry. Using a factor score is attractive because it extracts a component that is
common to the six committee characteristics. The second comprehensive measure,
CCQ2, is constructed by aggregating the governance quality scores of the six individual
measures. The quality score for an individual measure is coded 1 if the firm’s value of
that measure is greater than the median of that measure and 0 otherwise. CCQ2 is the
sum of the quality scores of the six individual measures for the firm, adjusted by
deducting the mean aggregate quality score in each two-digit SIC industry and deflated
by 6. Using an aggregate governance quality score has the advantage that it is better able
9

Jensen (1993) argues that in the context of boards of directors, larger boards can be ineffective
because of higher cooperation costs and more free riding. However, since less than one percent of the
compensation committees in our sample have more that eight directors, this argument has less relevance for
our study.
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to capture the orthogonal effects between monitoring mechanisms represented by the six
committee characteristics.
In summary, this study attempts to determine whether the relationship between
stock option grants and future firm performance is affected by the quality of the
compensation committee, where compensation committee quality is measured using a
combination of the six dimensions discussed in this section. We now turn to the structure
of the analysis to address this issue.

3.

Regression Model
We use two measures of future performance in our analyses. Following Hanlon et

al. (2003), we use future operating income as a measure of accounting performance. As
a second measure we use stock market performance.10 We use abnormal buy-and-hold
returns for the period t+1 to t+3 (inclusive) in these tests.
In this section, we proceed in three steps. We first state the benchmark model,
which is an expansion of the one used in Hanlon et al. (2003). We then add control
variables in equation (2). To address issues of endogeneity, we use a two-stage
regression approach, with instruments specified to model the determinants of stock option
grants and compensation committee quality. These are given in equations (3) and (4).
The benchmark model captures the relationship between future operating income
and current stock option grants. To test the hypothesis that future operating income is
more positively associated with CEO stock option grants for firms with high

10

However, Hanlon et al. (2003) argue that using a stock-based measure of future performance
introduces a circular dependence in such tests.
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compensation committee quality than for firms with low quality, the benchmark model is
expanded by including the compensation committee governance quality variable and its
interaction term with CEO stock option grants as follows:
(OI/S)i,t+k = γ0 + γ1CCQi,t + γ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + γ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + γ4(TA/S)i,t
+ industry fixed effects + e

(1)

where
OI/S

= the annual operating income before R&D expenses after selling and general
administrative expenses, deflated by the annual sales in year t+1, t+2, and
t+3,

CCQ

=

CSO/S =

TA/S

compensation committee governance quality, i.e., (1) CCQ1, which is based
on the first factor score from the factor analysis of the six committee
characteristics in year t, and (2) CCQ2, which is based on the aggregate
quality scores of the six characteristics in year t,
the value of new stock option grants to the CEO in year t+1, deflated by the
annual sales in year t+1.11 The value of new stock option grants is calculated
using the Black-Scholes model similar to Rajgopal et al. (2006).
Specifically, we collect the exercise price, stock price at the grant date,
number of securities granted, and the time to maturity from the Execucomp
database. We use the approximate average yield in the data year from a
seven-year U.S. Treasury bond as the risk-free rate of interest. We measure
expected stock return volatility by the annualized standard deviation of daily
stock returns over the 120 trading days preceding the end of the fiscal year
of the option grant,

= the total assets, deflated by the annual sales in year t.
We include total assets in our model since the operating income generated from

corporate assets is a fundamental economic production function of these assets (Lev and

11

Since prior research usually proposes that firm characteristics in year t affect the granting behavior
of stock options in year t+1 (e.g., Core and Guay 1999), we include new stock option grants for the CEO in
year t+1 in the model. A reason for using firm characteristics in year t is that a number of stock grants are
made during year t+1 rather than at the end of year t+1.
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Sougiannis 1996). Hanlon et al. (2003) also document evidence that total assets are
positively associated with future operating income.
The main model for this analysis is shown in equation (2). We augment equation
(1) with several control variables that may affect the performance consequences of stock
option grants. We use SALES to control for size effects (e.g., Leone et al. 2006). BM is
added to control for the effects of growth opportunities (e.g., Gaver and Gaver 1993).12
LEV is included for mediating the risk effects (e.g., Smith and Watts 1992). John and
John (1993) point out that the optimal management compensation package depends not
only on the agency relationship between shareholders and management, but also on the
contractual relationships that arise from having debt in the capital structure. They derive
a negative relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and leverage, and Ryan and
Wiggins (2002) demonstrate this empirically. LOSS is used in the model in that
performance may be treated differently between loss firms and profit firms in setting
compensation (Hayn 1995).
The model is:
(OI/S)i,t+k = λ0 + λ1CCQi,t + λ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +λ4(TA/S)i,t
+ λ5SALESi,t + λ6SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ7BMi,t + λ8BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1
+ λ9LEVi,t + λ10LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ11LOSSi,t+ λ12LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1
+ industry fixed effects + e

(2)

where
SALES =
12

sales, measured by the log value of net sales in year t,

Gaver and Gaver (1993) document that option granting is more common with growth companies.
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BM

= book-to-market value, measured by the book value of assets over the sum
of book value of liabilities and market value of equity in year t,

LEV

= leverage, measured by the debt-to-assets ratio in year t,

LOSS

= a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 for a loss firm in year t and 0
otherwise.
Equation (2) is run for years t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively, where year t is the

year for which the data of compensation committee governance quality is available.13
The model is also run by aggregating the three years’ ahead operating incomes (i.e.,
(OI/S)i,t+1 +(OI/S)i,t+2 +(OI/S)i,t+3). To control for fixed industry effects, we include
dummy variables for each two-digit SIC industry from which there are at least 10 firms in
the sample. If compensation committee governance quality has a positive impact on the
performance consequences of CEO stock option grants, the coefficient γ3 will be positive
and significant.14
To address issues of endogeneity, we use a two-stage regression procedure similar
to Frankel et al. (2006). 15 We rank firms by CEO stock options grants (i.e., CSO/S) and
then categorize them into three equal-sized portfolios. The portfolio rank of CSO/S (i.e.,
CSO/SRANK) is measured by 0, 1 or 2 for firms in the lowest, middle or highest portfolio,

13

The continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
In contrast, other studies such as Core et al. (1999) and Hanlon et al. (2003) first estimate the
portion of compensation that is related to governance factors and then examine the association between
governance-based estimated compensation and future firm performance. A weakness of this approach is
the potential measurement error in estimating governance-based compensation as a result of
misspecification and omitted variables. Our approach – examining the interaction between stock option
grants and governance quality – allows us to assess the importance of governance quality without having to
estimate governance-based option grants.
15
Issues of endogeneity are alleviated to the extent that it is future operating performance, up to
three years out, that is being regressed on current stock option grants.
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respectively. Similarly, the portfolio rank of compensation committee governance
quality (i.e., CCQRANK) is measured by 0, 1 or 2 based on the firms’ ranking of CCQ.16
Our first-stage regressions involve modelling the determinants of stock option
grants and compensation committee governance quality. Based on prior research (e.g.,
Hanlon et al. 2003), the determinants of stock option grants are examined in the
following model:
(CSO/S)i,t+1 = δ0 + δ1(R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t + δ4LEVi,t+ δ5NOLi,t
+δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t +δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1 + e

(3)

where
R&D/S = the annual research and development expense, deflated by the annual
sales in year t,
NOL

= net operating loss, measured by 1 if net operating loss carry-forwards
exist in the years t-2 to t and zero otherwise,

DC

= dividend constraint, measured by 1 if a firm experienced dividend
constraints in years t-2 to t and zero otherwise. A firm is
dividend constrained if the ratio of the sum of retained earnings and cash
dividends and stock repurchases over the sum of the prior year’s cash
dividends and stock repurchases is less than 2 in any of years t-2 to t,

CFS

= cash flow shortfall, measured by (common and preferred dividends +cash
flow used in investing activities - cash flow from operations)/total assets,
averaged over the years t-2 to t.
Further, we expect that the demand for high compensation committee governance

quality will depend on the CEO’s influence, substitute monitoring mechanisms, and the

16

We add CSO/SRANK or GQRANK in the models because endogeneity is likely to affect the
variation in CSO/S or GQ rather than the level of CSO/S or GQ (e.g., Greene 2000). Hentschel and Kothari
(2001) note that a relatively crude measure of the endogenous variable can be used as an instrumental
variable because it is likely to capture the level of the variable but not the endogenously determined
variations around those levels.

17

firm’s growth opportunities and size. Thus, we model the determinants of committee
governance quality as follows:
CCQi,t = µ 0 + µ 1CEOOWNi,t +µ 2CEOTENi.t +µ 3INSHDi,t+ µ 4GROWi,t +µ 5FSIZEi,t
+ µ 6CCQRANKi,t + e

(4)

where
CEOOWN = CEO ownership, measured by the percentage of shares owned by the
CEO in year t,
CEOTEN = CEO tenure, measured by the number of years for which the incumbent
CEO has been the CEO of the firm in year t,
institutional shareholding, measured by the percentage of shares owned
by institutional investors in year t,

INSHD

=

GROW

= growth opportunities, measured by the geometric growth rate in the
market value of assets through years t-2 to t,

FSIZE

= firm size, measured by the log of total assets in year t.
We include CEOOWN and CEOTEN because Bathala and Rao (1995), Baker and

Gompers (2003), and Kieschnick and Moussawi (2004) provide evidence that board
independence decreases with CEO influence. We include INSHD because institutional
shareholdings may be a substitute monitoring mechanism (e.g., Brickley et al. 1988,
Agrawal and Mandelker 1990, Rediker and Seth 1995). We include GROW because
several studies find that board independence is negatively associated with growth
opportunities (e.g., Bathala and Rao 1995, Lehn et al. 2003, Linck et al. 2005). Finally,
we include FSIZE as Barclay and Smith (1995a, 1995b) argue that agency conflicts
between managers and shareholders increase with firm size. After estimating equations
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(3) and (4), a second stage regression (i.e., equation (2)) is run using the fitted value of
CSO/S and CCQ from equations (3) and (4).
To consider the influence of the individual compensation committee quality
factors, we also estimate equation (2) replacing CCQ with (i) each of the six measures
individually (i.e., six separate models) and (ii) the six individual quality measures in a
single model. The former examines whether each compensation committee measure by
itself is related to future performance. The latter examines the relative influence of the
six compensation committee quality measures.
We also test the hypothesis using stock market performance as a firm
performance measure. Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) find that stock market performance
is positively associated with the incentives generated by executive stock option grants.
Based on Kedia and Mozumdar (2002), we estimate equation (5), which is similar to
equation (1) but uses future abnormal buy-and-hold returns in place of operating income:
BHRETi,t3 = γ0 + γ1CCQi,t + γ2 (CSOINC)i,t+1 + γ3 CCQi,t*(CSOINC)i,t+1
+ industry fixed effects + e

(5)

where
BHRET

= buy-and-hold abnormal return for years t+1 through t+3 compounded
monthly, computed each year as (1 + ri,1) x (1 + ri,2)...x (1 + ri,12) – (1 +
rm,1) x (1 + rm,2)...x (1 + rm12), where ri,j is the raw return and rm,j is the
portfolio return (based on the market index) for month j,

CSOINC = incentives generated by CEO stock option grants, measured by the delta
(i.e., the hedge ratio) of CEO stock option grants multiplied by the ratio of
the number of CEO stock option grants to the total shares outstanding
(Jensen and Murphy 1990, Yermack 1997).
In equation (5), a positive and significant γ3 would support H1.
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4.

Empirical Results

4.1

Sample and Descriptive Statistics
The sample selection begins by searching the IRRC Directors’ database for the

U.S. companies with compensation committees consisting solely of independent directors
in 2001.17 We focus on independent compensation committees because we want to
examine quality differences among independent compensation committees (since the
2003 listing rules require independent compensation committees). Based on the
information of committee memberships and board affiliations provided by IRRC, we
identify a raw sample of 1,225 firms with independent compensation committees from
the population of 1,771 firms. IRRC also provides directors’ information about employee
positions, board service time, and shareholding that this study needs. We then intersect
the IRRC sample firms with the Execucomp database to yield a reduced sample of firms
that also have information about the CEO’s service time and ownership. We also review
the proxy statements of the reduced sample firms from EDGAR SEC online
documentation to collect the information about the number of directors’ additional board
seats. This yields a sample of 925 firms with the data for each of the six committee
characteristics. Finally, we reduce the sample by deleting the observations without the
data used for the analyses from Execucomp, Compustat, and CRSP databases,
respectively. This generates a final sample consisting of 474 firms with independent

17

We use directors’ information released in 2001 because 2001 was the latest data year in the IRRC
Directors’ database when sample selection was initiated at the beginning of 2005. Also, using the data for
2001 allows us to avoid the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on corporate governance.
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compensation committees. We find that the manufacturing (51.9%), services (12.2%),
transportation, communication, electric, gas, and sanitary services (10.8%), retail trade
(8.2%), and finance, insurance, and real estate (7.4%) are the most widely represented
industries in the sample.
Table 1, panel A reports the percentages of directors with certain characteristics
on the compensation committee. 44.78% of 1,639 directors on the independent
compensation committees of the 474 firms were appointed during the tenure of the
incumbent CEO. 27.03% of the directors have at least 10 years’ board service time.
23.06% of the directors are CEOs of the other firms. 97.96% of the directors on the
compensation committee hold stock of the company. 35.69% of the directors have three
or more additional board seats. On average, there are about 3.46 directors on the
compensation committee. Table 1, panel B provides the descriptive statistics on the
director characteristics. The mean tenure of a director is about nine years. The mean
shareholding of individual directors is 0.23%, while the mean aggregate shareholding of a
compensation committee is 0.80%. On average, each director holds two additional board
seats.
Insert Table 1 about here
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the main analyses.
The means of OI/S for one-year, two-years, and three-years ahead are 0.212, 0.207, and
0.212, while their medians are 0.178, 0.173, and 0.177, respectively. The mean and
median for CCQ1 are 0.000 and -0.060, while the mean and median for CCQ2 are both
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0.000.18 CCQ1 is the first factor from the factor analysis of the six compensation
committee measures, which has an eigenvalue of 1.358 and loadings of 0.534, 0.767,
0.247, 0.458, 0.463, and 0.067 on APPOINT, SENIOR, CEODIR, SHARES, BUSYDIR,
and CMSIZE, respectively. CCQ2 is the aggregate quality score of the six compensation
committee measures among which the highest correlation coefficient is 0.243 between
APPOINT and SENIOR. The mean CEO stock option grant (i.e., CSO/S) is 0.002, which
compares with a mean of 0.005 for stock options granted to the top five executives in
Hanlon et al. (2003).
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among the main independent
variables. The factor-based measure CCQ1 has a high correlation with the aggregate
measure CCQ2 (r = 0.70). The correlation coefficient between (TA/S) and SALES is 0.89.
The regression results are not changed substantially when either of the two variables is
dropped from equation (2). In any event, our interest is in the sign and significance of γ3.
Insert Table 3 about here

4.2

Main Results
Table 4 contains the results of regressions that examine the effect of

compensation committee governance quality on the performance consequences of CEO
stock option grants for CCQ1. We find that the coefficients on the interaction term of
CCQ1 and CEO stock option grants are significant and positive for one-, two-, and three18

CCQ1 and CCQ2 are industry adjusted.
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years ahead operating income, and aggregate three-year ahead operating income (tstatistics = 3.28, 4.58, 3.81, and 4.25, respectively). These results support the hypothesis
that future operating income is more positively associated with CEO stock option grants
for firms with high compensation committee governance quality as measured by CCQ1.
In terms of our control variables, we find that the associations between future operating
income and CEO stock option grants are significantly lower for firms with (i) small size,
(ii) high book-to-market value, (iii) high leverage, and (iv) losses. This is consistent with
the view that small firms, low growth firms, and firms with losses have problems that
cannot be easily addressed through incentive compensation. The negative association
between the leverage interaction terms and performance sensitivity is consistent with the
prediction in John and John (1993).
Insert Table 4 about here
Table 5 reports that the coefficients on the interaction terms between CCQ2 and
CEO stock option grants are all positive and significant (t-statistics = 3.44, 4.67, 4.05,
and 4.43, respectively), suggesting that the associations of CEO stock option grants with
the one-, two-, three-year ahead operating income, and aggregate three-years ahead
operating income are higher when firms have high compensation committee quality
measured by CCQ2. Again, we find that the performance consequences of CEO stock
option grants are lower for small firms, low growth firms, highly levered firms, and firms
with losses.
Insert Table 5 about here
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Table 6, panel A presents the results from examining the effect of individual
compensation committee quality on the performance consequences of CEO stock option
grants for APPOINT, SENIOR, CEODIR, SHARES, BUSYDIR, and CMSIZE,
respectively. First, the one-, and three-year ahead operating income, and the aggregate
three-years ahead operating income are more positively associated with CEO stock option
grants for firms when APPOINT is high, indicating that CEO stock option grants generate
higher future operating income when the compensation committee contains fewer
directors who were appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO. Second, we also
find a positive association between future operating income and CEO stock option grants
for firms with more senior directors on the compensation committee (i.e., high SENIOR).
Third, the interaction between CEODIR and CSO/S is positive and significant in all four
models in panel A. This indicates that CEO stock option grants generate higher future
operating income when there are fewer directors on the compensation committee who are
CEOs of other firms. Fourth, the associations of the three-year ahead operating income,
and the aggregate three-years ahead operating income with CEO stock option grants are
higher for firms with high SHARES. These results suggest that CEO stock option grants
generate higher future operating income if directors who sit on the compensation
committee hold more shares of that firm. Fifth, Table 6, panel A provides evidence that
the associations of the one-, and two-year ahead operating income, and the aggregate
three-years ahead operating income with CEO stock option grants are higher for firms
with high BUSYDIR, which indicates that CEO stock option grants generate lower future
operating income when the compensation committee has more busy directors. Sixth, the
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two-year ahead operating income is more positively associated with CEO stock option
grants for firms with large compensation committees. Overall, we also find support for
H1 using individual compensation committee quality measures.
Insert Table 6 about here
Table 6, panel B reports the results of the regression including all the six
individual compensation committee quality measures in the same model. We find that
SENIOR*(CSO/S) is consistently and positively related to future income whether
measured using the one-, two-, or three-years ahead operating incomes, or the aggregate
three-years ahead operating income, suggesting that SENIOR is the dominant quality
component on a relative basis. We also find significant coefficients for
APPOINT*(CSO/S) and BUSYDIR*(CSO/S) in three of the four models and for
CEODIR*(CSO/S) in two of the four models, which suggests these are more influential
dimensions of quality of a relative basis. Finally, we find significant coefficients for
SHARES*(CSO/S) and CMSIZE*(CSO/S) in only one of the four models. Overall, this
suggests that the effects of SENIOR, APPOINT, BUSYDIR, and CEODIR dominate the
effects of SHARES and CMSIZE on a relative basis.
Table 7 presents the results from testing the hypothesis where firm performance is
measured by stock market performance. If H1 is supported, the coefficient on the
interaction term between compensation committee quality and incentives provided by
CEO stock option grants, i.e., γ3 in equation (5) will be positive and significant. We find
that the coefficient on the interaction of CCQ1 and the incentives is positive and
significant, consistent with H1. We also find that the coefficient on the interaction
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between CCQ2 and stock option incentives is positive and significant. Thus, we find
support for H1 using a stock market measure of performance when compensation
committee quality is measured by either CCQ1 or CCQ2.
Insert Table 7 about here

4.3

Robustness Tests
We also conduct additional analyses to test the robustness of the results. First, we

use the discounted expected gain approach instead of the Black-Scholes model to value
stock options. Hall and Murphy (2002) show that valuing stock options using the BlackScholes model results in overvaluation as the option cannot be traded, or (normally)
hedged, and when the employee is risk-averse and undiversified. Ittner et al. (2003) note
that employees may use simple approaches rather than the complicated Black-Scholes
model to value stock options. They propose the discounted expected gain approach to
value stock options by assuming an annual stock price growth of 15%, a five-year
holding period, and a risk-free rate of 5%. We find that the one-, two-, three-year ahead
operating income, and aggregate three-years ahead operating income are also more
positively associated with CEO stock option grants for firms with high CCQ1 or CCQ2
when the discounted expected gain approach is used (untabulated).
Second, we examine whether the results hold after adding non-CEO executives’
stock option grants. Thus, we include the total of new stock option grants to all
executives covered by the Execucomp database. Similar results (untabulated) are found
for both CCQ1 and CCQ2.
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Third, we replace stock option grants in year t+1 with option grants in year t in
equation (2) to examine whether the results are sensitive to the presumption that grants in
year t+1 reflect the governance quality in year t. The results (untabulated) hold for both
CCQ1 and CCQ2.
Fourth, this study also examines whether the results hold after controlling for the
non-linear relation between stock option grants and future operating income. Hanlon et
al. (2003) document a concave relation between stock option grants and future operating
income. Thus, we add the second power term of stock option grants in equation (2).
Again, we document significant evidence for both CCQ1 and CCQ2 (untabulated).
Fifth, we test the robustness of the results by adding historical operating income
in the model as Larcker (2003) argues that historical operating income is a natural
benchmark for future operating income. Untabulated results show that one-, two-, and
three-year ahead, and aggregate three-years ahead operating income are significantly
positively associated with CEO stock option grants for firms with higher CCQ1 or CCQ2.
Sixth, we examine whether compensation committee quality is an additional
characteristic, over a general measure of the quality of board governance. Following
prior research (e.g., Klein 2002a), we measure board quality using board independence.
After adding board independence and its interaction with stock option grants in equation
(2), we still find that future operating income is more positively associated with CEO
stock option grants for firms with high compensation committee quality than for firms
with low compensation committee quality, whereas we find no evidence on the positive
impact of board independence on the performance consequences of stock option grants.
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These results suggest that compensation committees serve a particular monitoring
mechanism, which is additional to the general monitoring mechanism of boards.

5.

Conclusion
We extend the limited research on compensation committee effectiveness. While

prior studies (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak 2003, Vafeas 2003) focus on compensation
committee effectiveness and CEO pay, we focus on the effect of compensation committee
quality on the relation between stock option grants and future firm performance.
Additionally, because U.S. listing rules now require all compensation committees to be
composed solely of independent directors, we develop a broad, multidimensional
measure of compensation committee quality.
We find that CEO stock option grants for firms with high comprehensive
compensation committee quality generate higher future operating income. In addition,
we also find strong evidence that the relation between future performance and CEO stock
option grants is significantly affected by the six individual compensation committee
characteristics, i.e., the proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the
incumbent CEO, the proportion of senior directors with at least 10 years’ board service,
the proportion of directors who are CEOs of the other firms, the aggregate shareholding
of directors, the proportion of directors with three or more board seats, and compensation
committee size. Finally, the results hold after conducting various additional tests.
Combined, our results support the view that higher compensation committee quality leads
to greater incentive alignment in executive compensation contracts.

28

Like all studies, this study also has its own caveats. First, it is likely that there are
significant differences between companies in the IRRC Directors’ and the Execucomp
databases, which were used to collect the sample, and other companies with regard to
governance characteristics and structure of CEO stock options. Thus, using the firms
from the IRRC Directors’ and the Execucomp database may affect the generalizability of
our results. Also, we limit our sample to firms that had independent compensation
committees in 2001 and that survived from 2001-2004. Thus, our sample may be biased
toward firms that had better governance and that were more successful. Future research
may focus on expanding the sample to include firms not covered by these databases or
using data from after 2003 when independent compensation committees became
mandatory. Finally, although this study identifies six compensation committee
characteristics based on the literature, the question of whether these six committee
characteristics can reflect the overall picture of a compensation committee’s governance
quality is still open. Future research may refine the development of governance quality
measures by adding other committee characteristics to those used in this study.

29

References
Aboody, D., and R. Kasznik. 2000. CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate
voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29: 73-100.
Abowd, J. M. 1990. Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate
performance? Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43(3): 52-73.
Agrawal, A., and R. Knoeber. 1999. Outside directors, politics, and firm performance. Working
paper. North Carolina State University.
Agrawal, A., and G. N. Mandelker. 1990. Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers:
The case of antitakeover charter amendments. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 25 (2): 143-161.
Anderson, R. C., and J. M. Bizjak. 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and
the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Banking and
Finance 27: 1323-1348.
Baker, M., and P. A. Gompers. 2003. The determinants of board structure at the initial public
offering. Journal of Law and Economics 46: 569-598.
Barclay, M., and C. W. Smith. 1995a. The maturity structure of corporate debt. Journal of
Finance 50: 609-632.
Barclay, M., and C. W. Smith. 1995b. The priority structure of corporate liabilities. Journal of
Finance 50: 609-632.
Bathala, C. T., and R. P. Rao. 1995. The determinants of board composition: An agency theory
perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics 16: 59-69.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71: 443-465
Bebchuk, L. A., and J. M. Fried. 2003. Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 17: 71-92.
Bebchuk, L. A., and J. M. Fried. 2004. Pay without performance: The unfilled promise of
executive compensation. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Bebchuk, L. A., J. M. Fried, and D. I. Walker. 2002. Managerial power and rent extraction in the
design of executive compensation. University of Chicago Law Review 69: 751-846.
Becker, G. P., and J. S. Stigler.1974. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of
enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3:1-18.
Bedard, J., S. M. Chtourou, and L. Courteau. 2004. The effect of audit committee expertise,
independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management’, Auditing: A Journal of
Practice & Theory 23(2): 13-35.
Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease, and C. W. Smith, Jr. 1988. Ownership structure and voting on
antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 267-291.
Bushman, R., Q. Chen, E. Engel, and A. Smith. 2004. Financial accounting information,
organizational complexity and corporate governance systems. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 37: 167-201.
Carcello, J. V., and T. L. Neal. 2000. Audit committee composition and auditor reporting. The
Accounting Review 75:453-467.
Carcello, J. V., and T. L. Neal. 2003. Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals
following “new” going concern reports. The Accounting Review 78: 95-116.
Carpenter, J., and B. Remmers. 2001. Executive stock option exercises and insider information.
Journal of Business 74: 513-534.
Conyon, M. J., and R. B. Freeman. 2002. Shared modes of compensation and firm performance:
UK evidence. Working paper. London School of Economics.

30

Conyon, M. J., and L. He. 2004. CEO compensation, incentives, and governance in new
enterprise firms. Journal of Derivatives Accounting 1: 47-60.
Conyon, M. J., and S. I. Peck. 1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and top
management compensation. Academy of Management Journal 41: 146-157.
Core, J., and W. Guay.1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal incentive levels. Journal
of Accounting and Economics 28: 151-184.
Core, J., R. Holthausen, and D. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer
compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51: 371-406.
Daily, C. M., J. L. Johnson, A. E. Ellstrand, and D. R. Dalton. 1998. Compensation committee
composition as a determinants of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal
41 (2): 209-220.
DeFusco, R. A., T. S. Zorn, and R. R. Johnson. 1991. The Association between executive stock
option plan changes and managerial decision making. Financial Management 20 (1): 3643.
Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences.
Journal of Political Economy 96: 1155-1177.
Ezzamel, M. and R. Watson. 1997. Wearing two hats:The conflicting control and management
roles of non-executive directors. In K. Keasey, S. Thompson, and M. Wright (editors),
Corporate governance: Economic and financial issues. Chichester: Oxford University
Press: 61-92.
Fahlenbrach, R., A. Low, and R. M. Stulz. 2008. Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside
directors? Working Paper, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University.
Faleye, O. 2008. CEO directors, executive incentives, and corporate strategic initiatives. Working
Paper, College of Business Administration, Northeastern University.
Fama, E., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and
Economics 26: 301-326.
Ferris, S. P., M. Jagannathan, and A. C. Pritchard. 2003. Too busy to mind the business?
Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance 68: 10871111.
Fich, E. M., and A. Shivdasani. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance
61: 689-724.
Frankel, R., S. P. Kothari, and J. Weber. 2006. Determinants of the informativeness of analyst
research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 41: 29-54.
Friday, H. S., and G. S. Sirmans. 1998. Board of director monitoring and firm value in REITs.
Journal of Real Estate Research 16 (3): 411-427.
Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1993. Additional evidence on the association between the
investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 125-160.
Greene, W. 2000. Econometric Analysis, 4th ed. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ
Hall, B. J., and K. Murphy. 2002. Stock options for undiversified executives. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 33: 3-42.
Hanlon, M., S. Rajgopal, and T. Shevlin. 2003. Are executive stock options associated with future
earnings? Journal of Accounting and Economics 36: 3-43.
Hayn, C. 1995. The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20: 125153.
Hentschel, L., and S. P. Kothari. 2001. Are corporations reducing or taking risks with derivatives?
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36 (1): 93-118.
Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.

31

Ittner, C. D., R. A. Lambert, and D. F. Larker. 2003. The structure and performance consequences
of equity grants to employees of new economy firms. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 34: 89-127.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control
systems. Journal of Finance 48: 831-880.
Jensen, M. C., and W. Meckling 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
Jensen, M. C., and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives.
Journal of Political Economy 98: 225-264.
John, T. A., and K. John. 1993. Top-management compensation and capital structure. Journal of
Finance 48 (3): 949-974.
Kedia, S., and A. Mozumdar. 2002. Performance impact of employee stock options. Working
paper, Rutgers University.
Kieschnick, R., and R. Moussawi. 2004. The board of directors: a bargaining perspective.
Working paper. University of Texas at Dallas.
Klein, A. 2002a. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 375-400.
Klein, A. 2002b. Economic determinants of audit committee independence. The Accounting
Review 77: 435-52.
Larcker, D. 2003. Discussion of “are executive stock options associated with future earnings?”
Journal of Accounting and Economics 36: 91-103.
Larcker, D. F., S. A. Richardson, and A. I. Tuna. 2007. Corporate governance, accounting
outcomes, and organizational performance. The Accounting Review 82: 963-1008.
Lazear, E. 1979. Why is there mandatory retirement? Journal of Political Economy 87: 1261-84.
Lehn, K., S. Patro, and M. Zhao. 2003. Determinants of the size and structure of corporate
boards:1935-2000. Working paper. University of Pittsburgh.
Leone, A. J., J. S. Wu, and J. L. Zimmerman. 2006. Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash
compensation to stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 167-192.
Lev, B., and T. Sougiannis. 1996. The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of R&D.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 21: 107-138.
Lie, E. 2005. Operating performance following open market share repurchase announcements.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 39: 411-436.
Linck, J. S., J. M. Netter, and T. Yang. 2005. The determinants of board structure. Working
paper. University of Georgia.
Lorsch, J. W., and E. MacIver. 1989. Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s corporate
boards. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Masson, R. T. 1971. Executive motivations, earnings and consequent equity performance.
Journal of Political Economy 79: 1278-1292.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation:
An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315.
Newman, H., and H. Mozes. 1999. Does composition of the compensation committee influence
CEO compensation practices. Financial Management 28: 41-53.
Rajgopal, S., T. Shevlin, and V. Zamora. 2006. CEOs’ outside employment opportunities and the
lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. Journal of Finance 61:
1813-1844.
Rediker, K., and A. Seth. 1995. Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative
governance mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal 16: 85-99.

32

Ross, S. A.1973. The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem. American Economic
Review 63: 135-39.
Ryan, H. E., and R. A Wiggins. 2002. The interactions between R&D investment decisions and
compensation policy. Financial Management 31 (1): 5-29.
Shivdasani, A., and D. Yermack. 1999. CEO involvement in the selection of new board members:
an empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 54: 1829-53.
Smith, C. W., and R. L Watts.1992. The investment opportunities set and corporate financing,
dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32: 263-292.
Useem, M. 1984. The inner circle. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vafeas, N. 2003a. Further evidence on compensation committee composition as a determinant of
CEO compensation. Financial Management 32: 53-70.
Vafeas, N. 2003b. Length of board tenure and outside director independence. Journal of Business
Finance & Accounting 30(7&8): 1043-64.
Wade, J., C. A. O’Reilly, and I. Chandratat.1990. Golden parachutes: CEOs and the exercise of
social influence. Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 587-603.
Yermack, D. 1997. Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements.
Journal of Finance 52: 449-477.

33

Table 1
Characteristics of compensation committees
Panel A. Percentages
Percent of compensation committee directors appointed during the tenure
of incumbent CEOs

44.78%

Percent of compensation committee directors with at least 10 years’
board service time

27.03%

Percent of compensation committee directors who are CEOs of other
firms

23.06%

Percent of compensation committee directors who hold stock of the
company

97.96%

Percent of compensation committee directors who have three or more
additional board seats

35.69%

Panel B. Descriptive statistics
Characteristics
Compensation committee size
Director tenure
Individual shareholdings
Aggregate shareholdings
Additional board seats

Mean
3.430
9.163
0.227%
0.801%
2.169

Median
3.000
8.000
0.024%
0.133%
2.000

Std Dev
1.880
6.347
1.471%
3.181%
1.383

Min
2.000
1.000
0.000%
0.000%
0.000

Max
10.000
45.000
29.450%
43.407%
12.000

Table 2
Descriptive statistics of variables
Variables
(OI/S)t+1
(OI/S)t+2
(OI/S)t+3
CCQ1t
CCQ2t
(CSO/S)t+1
(TA/S)t
SALESt
BMt
LEVt
LOSSt
(R&D/S)t
NOLt
DCt
CFSt
CEOOWNt
CEOTENt
INSHDt
GROWt
FSIZEt

N
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474
474

Mean
0.212
0.207
0.212
0.000
0.000
0.002
1.601
7.477
0.619
0.199
0.129
0.052
0.304
0.321
-0.192
0.013
7.426
0.654
1.223
7.617

Median
0.178
0.173
0.177
-0.060
0.000
0.001
1.078
7.438
0.631
0.191
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.000
-0.182
0.000
6.000
0.680
1.086
7.482

Std Dev
0.153
0.154
0.155
0.919
0.197
0.005
1.907
1.489
0.299
0.155
0.335
0.128
0.460
0.467
0.124
0.032
6.032
0.166
0.490
1.604

Q1
0.102
0.105
0.107
-0.581
-0.133
0.000
0.750
6.390
0.391
0.061
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.259
0.000
3.000
0.500
0.970
6.500

Q3
0.272
0.276
0.274
0.505
0.148
0.001
1.700
8.480
0.844
0.305
0.000
0.056
1.000
1.000
-0.115
0.008
10.000
0.800
1.300
8.600

(OI/S)t+1 : one year-ahead operating income, measured by the annual operating income before R&D
expenses after SGA, deflated by the annual sales in year t+1.
(OI/S)t+2 : two years-ahead operating income, measured by the annual operating income before R&D
expenses after SGA, deflated by the annual sales in year t+2.
(OI/S)t+3 : three years-ahead operating income, measured by the annual operating income before R&D
expenses after SGA, deflated by the annual sales in year t+3.
CCQ1t: comprehensive measure of compensation committee governance quality based on the first factor
score from the factor analysis of the six compensation committee characteristics in year t.
CCQ2t: comprehensive measure of compensation committee governance quality based on the aggregate
quality scores of the six compensation committee characteristics in year t.
(CSO/S)t+1 : the Black-Scholes value of new stock option grants for the CEO in a year, deflated by the
annual sales in year t+1.
(TA/S )t : the total assets, deflated by the annual sales in year t.
SALESt : sales, measured by the log of net sales in year t.
BMt : book-to-market value, measured by the book value of assets over the sum of book value of liabilities
and market value of equity in year t.
LEVt : leverage, measured by the debt-to-assets ratio in year t.
LOSSt: loss firm in year t, measured by 1 for a loss firm and 0 otherwise.
(R&D/S)t: annual research and development expense, deflated by the annual sales in year t,
NOLt: net operating loss, measured by 1 if net operating loss carry-forwards exist in the period of year t-2
to t and zero otherwise.
DCt: dividend constraint, measured by 1 if a firm experienced dividend constraints in the period of year t-2
to t and zero otherwise. A firm is dividend constrained if the ratio of the sum of retained earnings and cash
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dividends and stock repurchases over the sum of the prior year’s cash dividends and stock repurchases is
less than 2 in any of years t-2 to t.
CFSt: Cash flow shortfall, measured by (common and preferred dividends +cash flow used in investing
activities - cash flow from operations)/total assets, averaged over the period of years t-2 to t.
CEOOWNt: CEO ownership, measured by the percentage of shares owned by the CEO in year t.
CEOTENt: CEO tenure, measured by the number of years for which the incumbent CEO has been the CEO
of the firm in year t.
INSHDt: institutional shareholding, measured by the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors
in year t.
GROWt: growth opportunities, measured by the geometric growth rate in the market value of assets through
years t-2 to t.
FSIZEt: firm size, measured by the log value of total assets in year t.
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Table 3
Pearson correlations among independent variables
(n =474)
Variables
CCQ1t
CCQ2t
(CSO/S)t+1
(TA/S)t
SALESt
BMt
LEVt
LOSSt
(R&D/S)t
NOLt
DCt
CFSt
CEOOWNt
CEOTENt
INSHDt
GROWt

CCQ2t
0.70***

(CSO/S)t+1
-0.03
-0.01

(TA/S)t
-0.04
-0.06
0.24***

SALESt
-0.07
-0.16***
-0.33***
-0.03

BMt
0.02
0.09*
-0.30***
0.04
0.09**

LEVt
-0.05
-0.03
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.25***

LOSSt
0.03
0.07
0.05
0.07
-0.19***
0.15***
0.01

*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed.

(R&D/S)t
-0.03
-0.03
0.48***
0.36***
-0.35***
-0.34***
-0.13***
0.33***

NOLt
-0.06
0.01
0.06
-0.04
-0.02
-0.07
0.03
0.07
0.15***

DCt
-0.09*
-0.03
0.21***
0.04
-0.27***
-0.13***
0.09**
0.19***
0.25***
0.08*

CFSt
0.03
0.04
-0.13***
0.20***
0.12***
0.43***
0.04
0.24***
0.03
-0.05
-0.01

CEOOWNt
-0.03
0.02
-0.01
-0.05
-0.13***
-0.01
-0.10**
-0.04
-0.06
-0.07
0.03
-0.12**

CEOTENt
-0.18***
-0.14***
0.02
0.01
-0.13***
-0.06
0.02
-0.04
0.04
-0.02
0.05
-0.12***
0.34***

INSHDt
-0.11**
-0.07
0.04
-0.00
0.03
-0.17***
0.04
-0.13***
-0.00
0.13***
-0.00
-0.14***
-0.14***
0.02

GROWt
-0.10**
-0.06
0.45***
0.23***
-0.23***
-0.46***
-0.11**
0.05
0.43***
0.04
0.25***
-0.23***
0.07
0.11**
0.05

FSIZEt
-0.08*
-0.17***
-0.20***
0.35***
0.89***
0.10**
0.08
-0.14***
-0.17***
-0.04
-0.22***
0.20***
-0.18***
-0.12**
0.00
-0.09*

Table 4
Results for comprehensive compensation committee quality measure, CCQ1
Variables
Intercept

Predicted
Sign
?

1-Year Ahead
0.124
(2.67)***
-0.013
(-1.89)*
4.999
(0.50)
7.771
(3.28)***
0.043
(13.61)***
0.004
(0.84)
6.445
(4.58)***
-0.121
(-4.90)***
-29.155
(-3.61)***
0.105
(2.53)**
-53.814
(-6.68)***
0.012
(0.66)
-21.011
(-4.36)***

2-Year Ahead
0.040
(0.76)
-0.016
(-2.03)*
3.901
(0.35)
12.218
(4.58)***
0.035
(9.82)***
0.011
(2.11)**
6.939
(4.37)***
-0.068
(-2.46)**
-29.600
(-2.26)**
0.055
(1.17)
-29.947
(-3.30)***
0.021
(1.06)
-26.645
(-4.91)***

3-Year Ahead
0.039
(0.75)
-0.013
(-1.63)
24.317
(2.19)**
10.010
(3.81)***
0.036
(10.37)***
0.014
(2.64)***
2.900
(1.86)*
-0.110
(-4.04)***
-13.737
(-1.53)
0.063
(1.37)
-32.287
(-3.61)***
0.046
(2.30)**
-26.089
(-4.88)***

Total
0.203
(1.46)
-0.042
(-2.01)**
33.218
(1.12)
30.000
(4.25)***
0.114
(12.15)***
0.029
(2.06)**
16.284
(3.88)***
-0.299
(-4.08)***
-63.492
(-2.64)***
0.224
(1.80)*
-116.048
(-4.84)***
0.079
(1.48)
-73.745
(-5.14)***

Industry dummies

Included

Included

Included

Included

N
F-statistic

474
26.96***

474
18.16***

474
20.08***

474
24.85***

58.80%

48.54%

51.19%

56.73%

CCQt

?

(CSO/S)t+1

?

CCQt*(CSO/S)t+1

+

(TA/S)t

+

SALESt

?

SALESt*(CSO/S)t+1

?

BMt

?

BMt*(CSO/S)t+1

-

LEVt

?

LEVit*(CSO/S)t+1

-

LOSSt

?

LOSSt*(CSO/S)t+1

?

Adjusted R2

The figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
The two-stage regression models are as follows:
(OI/S)i,t+k =λ0 + λ1CCQi,t + λ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +λ4(TA/S)i,t + λ5SALESi,t
+ λ6SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ7BMi,t +λ8BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ9LEVi,t + λ10LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1
+ λ11LOSSi, +λ12 LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + industry fixed effects + e
(CSO/S)i,t+1 = δ0 + δ1 (R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t +δ4LEVi,t+δ5NOLi,t +δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t
+δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1+ e
CCQi,t = µ 0 + µ 1CEOOWNi,t +µ 2CEOTENi.t +µ 3INSHDi,t+ µ 4GROWi ,t+µ 5FSIZEi,t
+ µ 6CCQRANKi,t + e

(2)
(3)
(4)

where
CSO/SRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CSO/S.
CCQRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CCQ.
The other variables are defined in Table 2.
Total indicates the sum of 1-year ahead, 2-year ahead, and 3-year ahead operating income.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed.
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Table 5
Results for comprehensive compensation committee quality measure, CCQ2
Variables
Intercept

Predicted
Sign
?

1-Year Ahead
0.121
(2.59)**
-0.066
(-2.04)**
2.364
(0.24)
35.272
(3.44)***
0.043
(13.67)***
0.004
(0.88)
6.762
(4.81)***
-0.115
(-4.66)***
-30.006
(-3.72)***
0.089
(2.11)**
-47.531
(-5.69)***
0.012
(0.67)
-19.846
(-4.11)***

2-Year Ahead
0.037
(0.69)
-0.100
(-2.62)***
-0.565
(-0.05)
53.933
(4.67)***
0.035
(9.84)***
0.012
(2.13)**
7.461
(4.70)***
-0.059
(-2.14)**
-21.738
(-2.39)**
0.027
(0.56)
-20.301
(-2.16)**
0.022
(1.08)
-24.690
(-4.54)***

3-Year Ahead
0.035
(0.67)
-0.077
(-2.15)**
20.539
(1.86)*
46.008
(4.05)***
0.036
(10.42)***
0.014
(2.67)***
3.345
(2.15)**
-0.103
(-3.77)***
-14.695
(-1.64)
0.039
(0.85)
-23.947
(-2.59)**
0.046
(2.31)**
-24.394
(-4.56)***

Total
0.192
(1.38)
-0.237
(-2.48)**
22.339
(0.75)
135.213
(4.43)***
0.114
(12.20)***
0.030
(2.10)**
17.568
(4.20)***
-0.277
(-3.78)***
-66.439
(-2.77)***
0.154
(1.24)
-91.780
(-3.69)***
0.080
(1.50)
-68.930
(-4.80)***

Industry dummies

Included

Included

Included

Included

N
F-statistic

474
27.07***

474
18.20***

474
20.21***

474
24.97***

58.90%

48.59%

51.36%

56.86%

CCQt

?

(CSO/S)t+1

?

CCQt*(CSO/S)t+1

+

(TA/S)t

+

SALESt

?

SALESt*(CSO/S)t+1

?

BMt

?

BMt*(CSO/S)t+1

-

LEVt

?

LEVit*(CSO/S)t+1

-

LOSSt

?

LOSSt*(CSO/S)t+1

?

Adjusted R2

The figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
The two-stage regression models are as follows:
(OI/S)i,t+k =λ0 + λ1CCQi,t + λ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +λ4(TA/S)i,t + λ5SALESi,t
+ λ6SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ7BMi,t +λ8BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ9LEVi,t + λ10LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1
+ λ11LOSSi, +λ12 LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + industry fixed effects + e
(CSO/S)i,t+1 = δ0 + δ1 (R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t +δ4LEVi,t+δ5NOLi,t +δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t
+δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1+ e
CCQi,t = µ 0 + µ 1CEOOWNi,t +µ 2CEOTENi.t +µ 3INSHDi,t+ µ 4GROWi ,t+µ 5FSIZEi,t
+ µ 6CCQRANKi,t + e
where

(2)
(3)
(4)

CSO/SRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CSO/S.
CCQRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CCQ.
The other variables are defined in Table 2.
Total indicates the sum of 1-year ahead, 2-year ahead, and 3-year ahead operating income.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed.
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Table 6
Results for individual compensation committee quality measures
Variables

Predicted
Sign

1-Year Ahead

2-Year Ahead

3-Year Ahead

Total

Panel A. Separate regression
for each individual measure

APPOINT,t*(CSO/S)t+1

+

10.913
(1.81)*

10.683
(1.55)

36.105
(4.65)***

52.228
(2.90)***

SENIOR,t*(CSO/S)t+1

+

23.175
(3.18)***

26.579
(3.20)***

24.318
(2.99)***

74.072
(3.39)***

CEODIR,t*(CSO/S)t+1

+

29.382
(3.35)***

40.703
(4.09)***

17.651
(1.79)*

87.736
(3.33)***

SHARES,t*(CSO/S)t+1

+

BUSYDIR,t*(CSO/S)t+1

+

21.192
(3.12)***

37.352
(4.90)***

CMSIZE,t*(CSO/S)t+1

+

1.910
(0.95)

4.438
(1.93)*

-1.627
(-0.73)

4.721
(0.78)

APPOINTt*(CSO/S)t+1

+

9.003
(1.40)

13.372
(1.83)*

17.858
(2.51)**

40.233
(2.09)**

SENIORt*(CSO/S)t+1

+

16.766
(2.13)**

16.116
(1.81)*

19.592
(2.26)**

52.474
(2.24)**

CEODIRt*(CSO/S)t+1

+

12.678
(1.31)

20.521
(1.87)*

15.264
(1.43)

48.463
(1.67)**

SHARESt*(CSO/S)t+1

+

-176.476
(-0.20)

BUSYDIR,t*(CSO/S)t+1

+

14.924
(1.75)*

23.319
(2.42)**

1.891
(0.20)

40.135
(1.57)*

CMSIZEt*(CSO/S)t+1

+

2.916
(1.42)

5.346
(2.30)**

-0.788
(-0.35)

7.474
(1.22)

331.911
(0.39)

1117.841
(1.15)

3101.542
(3.30)***
8.852
(1.16)

4551.293
(1.78)*
67.396
(3.31)***

Panel B. Regression including
all individual measures

526.413
(0.52)

2902.243
(3.00)***

3242;179
(1.24)

The figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
The regression models for Panel A are as follows:
(OI/S)i,t+k =λ0 + λ1CCQi,t + λ2(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ3CCQi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +λ4(TA/S)i,t + λ5SALESi,t
+ λ6SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ7BMi,t +λ8BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + λ9LEVi,t + λ10LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1
+ λ11LOSSi, +λ12 LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + industry fixed effects + e
(2)
(CSO/S)i,t+1 = δ0 + δ1 (R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t +δ4LEVi,t+δ5NOLi,t +δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t
+δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1+ e
(3)
CCQi,t = µ 0 + µ 1CEOOWNi,t +µ 2CEOTENi.t +µ 3INSHDi,t+ µ 4GROWi ,t+µ 5FSIZEi,t
+ µ 6CCQRANKi,t + e
(4)
where
CCQ is one of the six individual compensation committee quality measures, APPOINT, SENIOR, CEODIR,
SHARES, BUSYDIR, and CMSIZE.
APPOINT: CEO appointed directors, measured by minus the proportion of directors on the compensation
committee appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO.
SENIOR: Senior directors, measured by the proportion of senior directors with 10 or more years of board
service time on the compensation committee.
CEODIR: CEO directors, measured by minus the proportion of the CEOs of other firms on the
compensation committee.
SHARES: Directors’ shareholdings, measured by the aggregate shareholdings of directors on the
compensation committee, deflated by the number of directors on the compensation committee.
BUSYDIR: Busy directors, measured by minus the proportion of directors with three or more additional
board seats on the compensation committee.
CMSIZE: Committee size, measured by the number of directors on the compensation committee.
CSO/SRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CSO/S.
CCQRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by each individual measure..
In Panel A, equation (3) is estimated for each individual measure separately.
The regression models for Panel B are as follows:
(OI/S)i,t+k = ψ0 + ψ1(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ2APPOINTi,t + ψ3APPOINTi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ4SENIORi,t
+ ψ5SENIORi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ6CEODIRi,t + ψ7CEODIRi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ8SHARESi,t
+ ψ9SHARESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ10CMSIZEi,t + ψ11CMSIZEi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 +ψ12(TA/S)i,t
+ ψ13 SALESi,t + ψ14 SALESi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ15 BMi,t + ψ16 BMi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ17 LEVi,t
+ ψ18 LEVi,t*(CSO/S)i,t+1 + ψ19 LOSSi, + ψ20 LOSSi,t*(CSO/S)i,t++ industry fixed effects + e (2’)
(CSO/S)i,t+1 = δ0 + δ1 (R&D/S)i,t + δ2SALESi,t + δ3BMi,t +δ4LEVi,t+δ5NOLi,t +δ6DCi,t+δ7CFSi,t
+δ8(CSO/SRANK)i,t+1+ e
(3)
CCQi,t = µ 0 + µ 1CEOOWNi,t +µ 2CEOTENi.t +µ 3INSHDi,t+ µ 4GROWi ,t+µ 5FSIZEi,t
+ µ 6CCQRANKi,t + e
(4)
In Panel B, equation (3) is estimated for all six individual measures simultaneously.
The other variables are defined in Table 2.
Total indicates the sum of 1-year ahead, 2-year ahead, and 3-years ahead operating income.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed.
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Table 7
Results on stock market performance

Variables

Predicted sign

Intercept

?

?

CCQt

CSOINCt+1

CCQt*CSOINCt+1

?

+

CCQ1
0.567

CCQ2
0.548

(6.66)***

(6.46)***

-0.006

-0.079

(-0.09)

(0.79)

13.524

15.226

(2.92)***

(3.28)***

9.324

58.440

1.68*

(2.62)***

Industry dummies

Included

Included

N

474

474

F-statistic
Adjusted R

2

1.96**

2.36***

3.33%

4.65%

The figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
The regression model is as follows:
BHRETi,t3 = γ0 + γ1CCQi,t + γ2 (CSOINC)i,t+1 + γ3 CCQi,t*(CSOINC)i,t+1 + industry fixed effects + e (5)
where
BHRET: buy-and-hold abnormal return, for years t+1 through t+3 compounded monthly each year,
computed as (1 + ri,1) x (1 + ri,2)...x (1 + ri,12) – (1 + rm,1) x (1 + rm,2)...x (1 + rm12), where ri,j is the raw return
and rm,j is the portfolio return (based on the market index) for month j.
CCQ: compensation committee governance quality, i.e., two comprehensive measures, CCQ1 and CCQ2.
CSOINC: Incentives generated by CEO stock option grants, measured by the delta (the hedge ratio) of CEO
stock option grants multiplied by the ratio of the number of CEO stock option grants to the total shares
outstanding.
The other variables are defined in Table 2.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Tests are two-tailed.

44

